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“Whoa, Edgar”: 
The Des Moines Register and Tribune, 
Cowles Publications, and 
J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI 
MATTHEW CECIL 
ON FEBRUARY 3, 1951, Louis B. Nichols, the powerful head 
of the public relations–oriented Crime Records Division of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), sent a memorandum to 
the bureau’s second-highest–ranking official, Associate Director 
Clyde Tolson. In his memorandum, Nichols noted that he had 
met a young Cowles Publications reporter, Clark Mollenhoff. 
Nichols added that he came away impressed. He noted that in 
1945 the Des Moines Special Agent in Charge had reported that 
Mollenhoff “was awkward, has a colorless personality, and does 
not appear to be a fluent talker.” The agent thought Mollenhoff 
would not develop satisfactorily. “Of course six years can make 
a lot of difference but I got entirely a different impression of 
Mollenhoff. He, frankly, looked exceedingly good to me.”1
 The FBI was not interested in Mollenhoff’s development as 
a watchdog journalist. Instead, given the FBI’s long-term focus 
on public relations, it was interested in whether or not it could 
count on Mollenhoff to withhold criticism of the FBI, to amplify 
the FBI’s successes, and, in certain circumstances, to come to the 
 
1. Louis B. Nichols, Memorandum to Clyde Tolson, 2/3/1951, FBI file 94-8-
137-94. 
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bureau’s defense against critics. For example, just the day before 
Nichols made his assessment of Mollenhoff, he had written to 
Tolson regarding public statements by the governors of Iowa 
and Nebraska, who had been criticizing what they saw as the 
FBI’s overzealous efforts to circumvent local police jurisdiction. 
“It seems to me that we should endeavor within the next two 
days to get up a good story of the Bureau’s coverage and juris-
diction pitched from the local angles of Nebraska and Iowa,” 
Nichols wrote, noting that the FBI had friends in newsrooms in 
Lincoln and Omaha who would surely help. In a handwritten 
note on the memo, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover agreed: “I indi-
cated some weeks ago a need for just such a story through our 
whole country.”2 Reporters like Mollenhoff, who represented 
newspapers in Des Moines and Minneapolis for Cowles Publi-
cations, were valuable contacts for FBI public relations officials. 
 Throughout the Hoover era, particularly from 1933 to 1972, 
the FBI monitored reporters, editors, publishers, and publica-
tions and evaluated them based on their willingness and ability 
to be helpful in amplifying the FBI’s preferred public relations 
messages.3 In 1959 the bureau compiled a report, “Molders of 
Public Opinion,” stating the agency’s reasons for monitoring 
the press: “Looking at the following representative segment of 
those molding public opinion today, we can raise the question 
as to whether or not many have made themselves worthy of 
American ideals so that they may be entrusted with carrying 
forward human progress and dignity.”4  
 The “Molders” memorandum focused primarily on the al-
leged communist affiliations of high-profile national journalists 
like I. F. Stone, Walter Lippmann, Drew Pearson, and James A. 
Wechsler, but the voluminous FBI files on John and Gardner 
(Mike) Cowles, the Des Moines Register and Tribune, and Clark 
Mollenhoff and several other key staffers demonstrate that the 
                                                 
2. Louis B. Nichols Memorandum to Clyde Tolson, 2/2/1951, FBI file, unseri-
alized. At times, the FBI failed to include a specific serial number on a docu-
ment. Files are, however, generally organized in chronological order. Unserial-
ized documents may be located within a given file using the date. 
3. Using the Freedom of Information Act, I have collected more than 90,000 
pages of FBI files on prominent journalists and publications. 
4. William C. Sullivan, “Molders of Public Opinion,” Memorandum to Alan H. 
Belmont, 3/18/1959, FBI file 100-40167-7, iii. 
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bureau’s interest in activities of the press extended to regional 
and local publications as well national ones.  
 The copious detail in the files reveals the lengths to which 
the FBI would go to build and maintain relationships with me-
dia representatives. Incidents when relationships faltered dem-
onstrate ongoing evaluations by FBI officials who categorized 
journalists and publications as friend or foe. And the tenor of 
correspondence and contacts between the FBI and staff at the 
Register and Tribune and Cowles Publications offers a glimpse 
into the ways each side curried favor and sought access to the 
other.5 A review of these files also provides insight into how 
Hoover and the FBI viewed legendary journalists with Iowa 
connections—Mike and John Cowles, Clark Mollenhoff, Wil-
liam Wesley Waymack, Richard Lawson Wilson, and others.  
 
ACTING against the wishes of Congress, Attorney General 
Charles J. Bonaparte created an investigative bureau within the 
Justice Department in 1908. Earlier that year, Congress had re-
jected an effort to create an investigative agency in the Justice 
Department, citing fears of centralized police power.6 That con-
troversy created an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for the FBI and 
its precursor agencies, setting it up as a target for critics, par-
ticularly during periods when the bureau’s jurisdiction and 
authority were expanded. Creating an image of restraint and 
utility to counter critics who questioned the legitimacy of FBI 
jurisdiction and tactics was a key motivator underlying the 
FBI’s public relations efforts.7
                                                 
5. In 1903 Gardner Cowles purchased a controlling interest in the Des Moines 
Register. In the 1920s Cowles consolidated all of the major newspapers in Des 
Moines and formed the Register and Tribune Company, publishing the Regis-
ter in the morning and the Tribune in the afternoon. In the 1930s, as his sons 
took over the company, they expanded to Minneapolis, eventually gaining 
control of all of the major papers in that city, then launching Look magazine 
and several other publications all under the auspices of Cowles Publications. 
See William B. Friedricks, Covering Iowa: The History of the Des Moines Register 
and Tribune Company (Ames, 2000) 
6. Athan Theoharis et al., eds., The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (New 
York, 2000), 141–42; Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. Edgar 
Hoover and the Great American Inquisition (Philadelphia, 1988), 43, 84, 88, 99. 
7. Theoharis et al., eds., The FBI, 102–3, 141–42.  
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J. Edgar Hoover in an undated photo from FBI files. 
 J. Edgar Hoover had previously served as head of the Gen-
eral Intelligence Division of the Justice Department and was a 
key figure in the controversial 1920 Red Scare Palmer Raids that 
rounded up suspected anarchists and communists. He became 
director of the Bureau of Investigation four years later. From 1924 
to 1934, Hoover’s bureau operated quietly, with much of the di-
rector’s energy expended in reorganizing and professionalizing 
the organization. Specifically, Hoover spent those early years 
tuning the agency’s bureaucratic structure and steering clear of 
the corruption temptations of prohibition enforcement. As late as 
1934, when Hoover had been director of what was then the Divi-
sion of Investigation (renamed the FBI in 1935) for ten years, the 
agency’s work remained little known outside of Washington. Six 
years later, however, Hoover and his special agents were cultural 
icons, lionized in the news and entertainment media.8  
                                                 
8. Ibid., 362–64; Eugene Lewis, Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bu-
reaucratic Political Power: The Organizational Lives of Hyman Rickover, J. Edgar 
Hoover, and Robert Moses (Bloomington, IN, 1980), 94; Richard Gid Powers, 
Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York, 1987), 227. 
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 In those few years, Hoover’s FBI moved from the fringes of 
the public mind to the center of politics and popular culture in 
America. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal had 
gathered increased power within the federal government, in-
cluding an emphasis on federal law enforcement and public 
relations. After dabbling in media relations in the early 1930s, 
Hoover created the Crime Records Division in 1935 and named 
Louis B. Nichols to head the division. Crime Records handled 
public affairs for the bureau throughout the remaining three 
decades of Hoover’s tenure, and Nichols came to be considered 
by some to be the second most influential person in the history 
of the FBI. By 1936, the FBI had grown from fewer than 100 
agents in 1930 to nearly 900 agents stationed in the Seat of Gov-
ernment, as FBI headquarters in Washington was called, and in 
52 field offices nationwide.9  
 The once unknown Hoover and his FBI had become “reas-
suring symbol[s] of security and stability for most Americans.”10 
For decades, reports of FBI exploits captured the public imagi-
nation as the agency grew in size, in jurisdiction, and as a source 
of public interest. FBI public relations efforts, beginning with 
the war on crime in the 1930s and continuing with the war on 
communism in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, included an ongo-
ing series of organized communication campaigns aimed at so-
lidifying the bureau’s position in society, establishing Hoover 
as America’s top cop, and alleviating public fears of the bureau 
becoming an American secret police.11
 Relationships with key reporters, editors, and publishers in 
Washington and across the country were key to Hoover’s efforts 
to maintain his central position in American culture and govern-
ment.12 In many cases, those reporters, editors, and publishers 
                                                 
9. Kenneth O’Reilly, “A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, 
Crime Control, and National Security,” Journal of American History 82 (1982), 
642; Theoharis et al., eds., The FBI, 176, 346; Theoharis and Cox, The Boss, 157. 
10. Powers, Secrecy and Power, 227. 
11. Theoharis and Cox, The Boss, 43, 84, 88, 99. 
12. See, for example, Matthew Cecil, “ ‘Press Every Angle’: FBI Public Rela-
tions and the ‘Smear Campaign’ of 1958,” American Journalism 19 (2002), 39–58; 
and Matthew Cecil, “Friends of the Bureau: Personal Correspondence and the 
Cultivation of Journalist-adjuncts by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI,” Journalism and 
Mass Communication Quarterly 88 (2011), 267–84. 
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provided Hoover with a megaphone for his message and a will-
ing team of defenders against criticisms of the FBI. In other cases, 
the relationships were merely a function of ongoing media rela-
tions efforts to promote the bureau’s preferred image of itself 
through the pages of local and regional newspapers.  
 
THERE ARE MYRIAD DEFINITIONS of public relations, 
but most scholars agree that the practice is distinguished from 
simple publicity by its focus on gaining insight into the nature 
of the audience. The term public relations was coined in 1920, 
when Edward Bernays outlined the practice in his book Crystal-
lizing Public Opinion. Bernays later termed public relations work 
as the “engineering of consent” in which expert communicators 
research their audiences, gain an insight about what motivates a 
person to act, and craft persuasive messages for those narrowly 
defined groups of people. This strategic intent, the effort to en-
gineer consent described by Bernays, separates the practice of 
public relations from earlier, non-strategic communication 
techniques like press agentry or publicity.13  
Subsequent scholars have expanded the definition to include 
cultural aspects, focusing more clearly on the individuals who 
make up the audience.14 For the purposes of this study, public 
relations is defined as public communication seeking to build 
and maintain communities of meaning with those who share 
the organization’s preferred image of itself. The relationships es-
tablished through public relations techniques may be seen as a 
source of cultural capital for the organization, each relationship 
holding the potential for action on behalf of the communicator. 
Voters may vote. Supporters may come to an organization’s de-
                                                 
13. Edward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York, 1923), 166–67; 
Edward Bernays, “The Engineering of Consent,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 250 (1947), 113. 
14. This study relies on a composite definition arrived at after reviewing popu-
lar public relations textbooks and scholarly papers. I assume that public rela-
tions, as defined by the founder of the field, Edward Bernays, must include the 
gathering of insight into the audience, whether that is produced via formal or 
informal means. For an exploration of public relations definitions, see Dean 
Kruckeberg and Kenneth Starck, Public Relations and Community: A Recon-
structed Theory (New York, 1988), 16. 
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fense in a crisis. Common understandings create an atmosphere 
more conducive to change that is in the organization’s interest.15
 The FBI was among the first government agencies in the 
United States to practice public relations on a broad scale and 
with a long-term vision. Beginning in 1934, the FBI developed 
a cohesive message that characterized its public relations mes-
sages for the ensuing 38 years of Hoover’s tenure. That public 
relations template was designed to counter challenges to the 
agency’s legitimacy borne in concerns about centralized federal 
law enforcement authority. Some early critics of the FBI worried 
about the creation of an American “Gestapo.” Thus, the FBI’s 
public relations messages emphasized neutral, scientific law 
enforcement, touted the organization’s restraint, and promoted 
Hoover as America’s top cop.16
 But it was the information-gathering element of FBI public 
relations that was particularly groundbreaking. In the mid-1930s, 
the FBI formalized the public relations duties of the Special 
Agents in Charge (SACs), who supervised the more than 50 
local offices of the FBI. Bureau manuals required each SAC to 
begin each day by reviewing local newspapers, clipping articles 
of interest to the FBI, visiting with key opinion shapers in the 
community, and forwarding all of that intelligence to Washing-
ton. SACs became the collectors of insight into the audiences for 
the FBI’s message. Finally, the Crime Records Division compiled 
that information and communicated it to the FBI’s top leader-
ship. The bureau’s Executive Conference, composed of the top 
handful of division leaders and assistant directors and chaired 
by Hoover’s closest confidante, Associate Director Clyde Tol-
                                                 
15. Public relations historians have disagreed about whether the practice ex-
isted prior to Bernays’s twentieth-century epiphany or if Bernays simply de-
fined a longstanding practice. In 2010 Margot Opdycke Lamme and Karen 
Miller Russell reviewed the scholarship and suggested that the strategic intent 
of an organization may be discerned from the scope and nature of tactics em-
ployed. In other words, by reviewing what kinds of public relations campaigns 
an organization engaged in, one can determine whether that organization was 
practicing strategic communication. Margot Opdycke Lamme and Karen 
Miller Russell, “Removing the Spin: Toward a New Theory of Public Relations 
History,” Journalism and Communication Monographs 11 (2010), 354. 
16. Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin (New York, 1996), 365; Powers, 
Secrecy and Power, 94–98, 108–12. 
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son, was responsible for identifying key challenges and making 
recommendations for public relations and other policies.17  
FBI public relations policies were refined in 1936. Under the 
new rules, all news stories issued from the bureau came out over 
Hoover’s signature. No one but Hoover could publicly accept 
credit for any FBI successes. SACs were prohibited from provid-
ing information about bureau activities to anyone outside the FBI, 
including news reporters, without receiving prior permission 
from Washington. Only Hoover was empowered to speak on 
policy or to respond to inquiries about ongoing investigations. 
All speeches delivered by special agents had to be cleared with 
Washington. SACs were even prohibited from recommending 
any books not included on the FBI’s official bibliography.18
By the mid-1930s, the FBI was a bureau built for public rela-
tions. It had a ready-made public relations template emphasizing 
science, restraint, and Hoover. It boasted an in-house public rela-
tions division, more than 50 SACs gathering insight in the field, 
and a policy-making group of top managers in Washington. Most 
FBI monitoring and evaluation of national and regional reporters, 
editors, and publishers can be traced in FBI files to the mid-1930s. 
That sophisticated system of information gathering and evalua-
tion led individuals and their publications to be categorized as 
friend or foe. The national journalists who merited mention in 
the “Molders of Public Opinion” report were clearly labeled as 
enemies of the FBI because their backgrounds or their work in-
cluded what the bureau considered to be subversive elements. 
More commonly, though, the FBI reached no definitive and 
final conclusion about individual reporters or their publications. 
Typically, FBI officials revisited their judgments periodically. 
Hoover and the Crime Records Division had long memories for 
what they perceived as criticism of the FBI, but absent a sus-
tained campaign of “subversive” content, most publications and 
individuals had an up-and-down relationship with the bureau. 
The staff of the Des Moines Register and Tribune and Cowles Pub-
lications exemplify that sort of relationship with the FBI.  
                                                 
17. Sullivan, “Molders of Public Opinion,” 15–16; Theoharis et al., eds., The 
FBI, 214. 
18. Manual, Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, ca. 1927, 1936, chap. 2, 
sections 22, 23, 25, pp. 30–31. 
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HOOVER’S COLLABORATIONS with the Des Moines Register 
and Tribune began in 1934 when what was then known as the Di-
vision of Investigation was just beginning to expand its public 
relations efforts. That year, the division’s high-profile pursuit of 
outlaw John Dillinger played out in the press. With the surge of 
interest in Dillinger and other midwestern outlaws, the division 
began evaluating individual reporters and publications when a 
reporter or editor contacted the agency seeking access to law en-
forcement information. Those evaluations—determining whether 
or not reporters and their publications were friendly—were on-
going; conclusions that were drawn in the moment lived on, 
sometimes for decades, in subsequent bureau memoranda 
evaluating media organizations and individual journalists.  
The first substantive collaboration between the Division of 
Investigation and the Des Moines Tribune occurred in 1934 when 
reporter Richard L. Wilson contacted Hoover’s closest adviser, 
Clyde Tolson, who had grown up in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to 
inquire about writing a series of stories on the spate of kid-
nappings then plaguing the middle third of the United States. 
Wilson was given a series of case summaries and photographs 
to prepare his stories.19 When Wilson’s articles were published 
in February and March 1934, they were reviewed in Washington 
by Inspector W. H. Drane Lester, who found them well written 
and interesting but was concerned by the repeated use of the 
term “Black Chamber” to refer to the Division of Investigation. 
The phrase, a reference to the brutal tactics of the Spanish Inqui-
sition, directly conflicted with the restrained image Hoover and 
his public relations team preferred to project. “It will, I fear, give 
the reader the idea that third degree methods are used by the 
Division of Investigation,” Lester wrote. Hoover agreed, scrawl-
ing a note at the bottom of the memorandum: “I agree that we 
should discourage the use of the phrase ‘Black Chamber.’”20
Ten years later, the bureau might have blackballed Wilson 
for employing creative license that undermined the FBI’s public 
relations message. But in those early days of Division of Inves-
tigation public relations, prior to the arrival of Louis B. Nichols 
                                                 
19. Clyde Tolson, memorandum for J. Edgar Hoover, 2/23/1934, FBI file 80-69-6. 
20. William H. Drane Lester, memorandum for J. Edgar Hoover, 3/30/1934, 
FBI file 80-69-9. 
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as head of the Crime Records Division, the Black Chamber ref-
erence was forgiven in the context of the generally highly favor-
able image of the Division of Investigation in Wilson’s series. 
 As time passed, contact between the FBI and the Register 
and Tribune in the 1930s followed the FBI’s preferred template. 
Reporters or editors seeking access to popular stories about the 
FBI were expected to accept the bureau’s rules of engagement. 
The FBI exercised tight control over its information, and when 
it did provide access, a journalist could expect that the agency 
would carefully review the resulting stories (clips of which 
were typically forwarded to Washington by the nearest SAC as 
part of their daily public relations duties). The bureau’s public 
relations staff typically responded to stories deemed critical or 
inaccurate with a tendentious letter over Hoover’s signature. 
Early exchanges between the FBI and the Register and Tribune 
were relatively cordial, but there were some points of contention.  
 In 1939 Des Moines SAC Frank Holloman forwarded a 
memorandum to his supervisor summarizing “crime condi-
tions” in Des Moines. The packet of information included a list 
of Des Moines public officials, a listing of key staff of the Des 
Moines Register and Tribune, and an overview of the FBI’s con-
tacts with the newspaper, noting editorials in 1936 and 1938 
that praised the bureau; editorial cartoons by a Hoover favorite, 
J. N. “Ding” Darling; and reviews of several news stories about 
the FBI written by Richard Wilson in Washington. Holloman 
judged relations with the Register and Tribune as friendly, with 
the exception of one article. 
 Holloman’s memorandum discussed that article, a news 
story by Wilson that appeared on December 17, 1936, exten-
sively. The story obliquely criticized Hoover in connection with 
the capture of bank robber and kidnapper Harry Burnette (Tol-
son had personally made the arrest in New York to boost his 
thin law enforcement credentials). Holloman wrote, “Although 
Wilson did not make personal statements in this article concern-
ing the Director, his innuendos were such as to have the impres-
sion of a condemnation of the Director’s activities in connection 
with that case.”21 The story insinuated irresponsible behavior 
                                                 
21. F. C. Holloman, summary memorandum for Mr. Hendon, “The Des Moines 
Register and Tribune,” 12/6/1939, FBI file 94-8-137-unserialized. 
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by the FBI director, a direct challenge to one element of the bu-
reau’s public relations template, thus undermining the agency’s 
legitimacy.  
 Retribution was swift and, seemingly, final. As a result of 
that article, Wilson and all Des Moines Register and Tribune per-
sonnel were removed from the FBI mailing lists, the equivalent 
of being put on a blacklist. The restoration of mailing privileges 
in 1937 demonstrates how the bureau re-evaluated its relation-
ships periodically.22 However, another more contentious edito-
rial severely damaged the relationship in 1940. 
In February 1940 FBI raids on the Detroit homes of activists 
accused of having volunteered to fight in the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade in the Spanish Civil War precipitated another series of 
critical news stories that threatened the FBI’s legitimacy. The 18 
people accused had, according to the FBI, violated a federal law 
prohibiting recruitment of Americans to fight in foreign wars. It 
was not the charges, though, that alarmed the FBI’s critics. The 
tactics of the raids disturbed critics who feared potential abuses 
of power by federal law enforcement. Bureau agents broke down 
doors at 5 a.m. and allegedly conducted warrantless searches of 
homes and offices of the accused. Defendants were not allowed 
to contact lawyers and were paraded in chains before press pho-
tographers. Editorials in the Milwaukee Journal, the New Republic, 
and the New York Daily News expressed outrage. The charges 
represented a direct threat to the bureau’s carefully constructed 
public relations message of responsibility and utility and led to 
a U.S. Senate inquiry into law enforcement methods.23
Former Republican turned Independent Senator George 
Norris of Nebraska wrote to Attorney General Robert H. Jack-
son expressing his concern about the FBI’s conduct. Norris re-
peated the charges of mistreatment that had been reported in 
the press. He noted that by the time of the arrests the Spanish 
Civil War was over, and the accused “were not criminals; there 
was no reason to believe that any of them would try to escape. 
They were not charged with an offense that had any odium at-
                                                 
22. Milton A. Jones, memorandum for Cartha DeLoach, 5/11/1959, FBI file 94-
8-137-107. 
23. Theoharis et al., eds., The FBI, 114. 
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tached to it; and yet they were treated as if they were well-
known to be criminals of the lowest type.”24
As later became a pattern when critical incidents occurred, 
Hoover responded by demonizing, without identifying, his ene-
mies, accusing them of a coordinated smear campaign against 
the FBI by anti-American forces. In a series of speeches to conser-
vative groups, Hoover drew clear lines between his critics and 
his supporters. In so doing, he emphasized differences between 
those who adhered to the FBI’s version of patriotism and those 
who did not. His critics were “international confidence men,” 
“conspiring Communists, their fellow travelers, mouthpieces 
and stooges,” and made up a “fifth column,” bent on destroy-
ing the nation that Hoover’s restrained agents and their dispas-
sionate, scientific law enforcement techniques were protecting.25
Hoover delivered one of those speeches to a meeting of the 
Daughters of the American Revolution. His characterization of 
his critics as communists or fellow travelers caught the attention 
of Register and Tribune editors. In his speech, Hoover defended 
his bureau and said its critics were anti-American. 
I charge that accusations in dictating a purpose on the part of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to become an OGPU or Gestapo, a 
national police, or anything resembling such bodies, emanate di-
rectly, or indirectly from certain anti-American bodies who hope 
to discredit the FBI as a step in a general plan to disrupt the entire 
United States or from well-meaning, but misinformed persons who 
have fallen for the lies and utterly false information of those who 
would tear asunder America’s machinery of law enforcement.26
 On April 20, 1940, the Register responded with an editorial 
headlined, “Whoa, Now, Edgar, Let’s Clarify!” The editors said 
that they were unanimously in support of the FBI’s work, but 
suggested that Hoover was unfairly categorizing his critics. 
But we hope J. Edgar isn’t trying to convey the impression that any-
body who at anytime criticizes something the FBI does, must there-
fore be “anti-American” or Communist. . . . We hardly think Sena-
tor Norris, for example, who was incensed by the high-handedness 
                                                 
24. Senator George Norris to Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, 2/22/1940, 
FBI file 94-4-4514-1X. 
25. Theoharis et al., eds., The FBI, 115. 
26. Des Moines Register, 4/19/1940. 
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of the FBI’s Detroit raids, is either a Communist or even “anti-
American.” No, we don’t think the FBI wants to become an “Ogpu” 
[sic] or “Gestapo.” But we certainly don’t think it needs to be im-
mune to debate and criticism, either. Just so we understand each 
other, Director!27
 The editorial directly undermined two elements of FBI pub-
lic relations and legitimation campaigns by directly criticizing 
Hoover and suggesting that agents in the Detroit raids were 
overzealous. FBI officials responded first by trying to arrange a 
meeting between Register and Tribune president and publisher 
Mike Cowles and a prominent Des Moines citizen, Dr. Tom 
Denny. Denny owned the Insurance Exchange Building that 
housed the FBI’s local office and was a close friend of the Cowles 
family. Denny, agent R. C. Hendon suggested, should sit down 
for dinner with Cowles, discuss the situation, and “try to 
straighten them [sic] out.”28
 Hoover further suggested that Cowles be sent a letter be-
cause “they have distorted my speech & only read part of it.”29 
On April 24 Hoover wrote to Cowles, “I want to reiterate to you 
that very definitely the recent campaign which has been directed 
against the Bureau was inspired by un-American forces and 
through the lies and misinformation which they distributed, 
well-meaning and otherwise sincere persons were victimized by 
their falsehoods. . . . It is your duty to criticize freely when there 
is a need; it also is the American duty to stand by the brave, 
honest, efficient officers who give of their best for the com-
munities they serve.”30 Hoover’s staff did not believe that Cowles 
was behind the attack, but just a few weeks before, on March 14, 
Cowles had raised concerns about the Detroit raids with the 
FBI’s Des Moines SAC E. R. Davis. “In this connection,” Davis 
reported to Hoover, “MR. COWLES stated that possibly the Bu-
reau Agents were caught off first base at Detroit, Michigan.”31
                                                 
27. Des Moines Register, 4/20/1940, FBI file 94-8-137-56. 
28. R. C. Hendon, memorandum for Clyde Tolson, 4/20/1940, FBI file 94-8-137-
56X.  
29. Ibid. 
30. J. Edgar Hoover to Gardner Cowles, 4/24/1940, FBI file 94-8-137-56X. 
(Note that related FBI documents often carry the same internal serial number.) 
31. E. R. Davis to J. Edgar Hoover, 3/14/1940, FBI file 94-8-137-52. 
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Hoover’s handwritten note on an FBI routing slip, March 14, 
1940, FBI 94-8-137-52. 
 Two months later, Des Moines Register reporter Don Grant 
told SAC Davis that he believed the FBI had been irresponsible 
in the Detroit raids. According to Davis, Grant “believed some 
of the criticisms were well-taken. . . . Thereafter, he commented 
on the possibility of the F.B.I. becoming a Gestapo, etc.” Davis 
told Grant that the FBI “was doing more to guard the civil lib-
erties of this country than any other organization,” and then 
reported the conversation to his superiors. When Hoover read 
the memorandum, he dismissed it as more evidence of the un-
trustworthiness of the Register and Tribune: “A typical news-
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In April 1940 Hoover ordered the removal of Des Moines Register 
and Tribune staff from the FBI mailing list. FBI 94-8-137-57. 
paperman’s viewpoint when it has been molded by Newspaper 
Guild propaganda.”32
 As a result of the “Whoa, Edgar” editorial, the FBI again re-
moved all Register and Tribune staffers except Darling from its 
mailing list.33 Mailing list privileges were subsequently restored, 
                                                 
32. Ibid. 
33. Robert C. Hendon, memorandum for Clyde Tolson, 4/22/1940, FBI file 94-
8-137-57. 
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but the FBI continued to assert that the criticisms were part of an 
organized “smear campaign” by its enemies. The bureau did 
not forget what it saw as an anti-American attack by “Newspa-
per Guild” propagandists. It was the type of black mark that re-
mained on the Register and Tribune’s FBI record, shaping the bu-
reau’s relationship with the publications for decades. In 1942, for 
example, Nichols requested a listing of newspapers deemed un-
friendly to the FBI due to their editorial policies. The Des Moines 
Register and Tribune were among approximately 15 newspapers 
on the list with the reason listed as “derogatory editorial.”34
 By October 30, 1945, the FBI was ready to begin rebuilding 
its relationship with the Register and Tribune. After a laudatory 
article about the bureau by George Coleman appeared in the 
Register, Hoover’s public relations aides suggested that the di-
rector write to Coleman to thank him. “In view of the lapse of 
time since [the publication of the ‘Whoa, Edgar’ editorial] and 
insofar as it does not appear any worthwhile purpose would be 
accomplished in not writing to a staff member of this newspaper 
at this time, it was felt that a letter of appreciation might now be 
in good order,” Nichols wrote in a note attached to a letter for 
Hoover to sign.35  
 Just six weeks later, though, the bureau noted another criti-
cal report in the Register. On December 5, 1945, the Register 
published a story by Nat Finney headlined “FBI Charges State 
Department Favors Reds.” The story claimed that Hoover had 
leaked information to reporters about alleged communist sym-
pathizers in the State Department. The leak, according to Fin-
ney’s unnamed sources, was retaliation for the State Department 
clearing two spies arrested by the FBI. “G-men have been shad-
owing state department people for a long time,” Finney wrote, 
“and the story planted in New York is regarded here as an open 
invitation to congress to ask the FBI what it has uncovered.”36
                                                 
34. Memorandum for Louis B. Nichols [redacted], 3/1/1942, FBI file 94-8-45. 
Inexplicably, the FBI’s FOIA censors redacted the names of the other newspa-
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35. Louis B. Nichols, note on J. Edgar Hoover letter to George Coleman, 
10/30/1945, FBI file 94-8-137-74. 
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 The vengeful, secretive FBI depicted in Finney’s story was 
again a direct challenge to public perceptions of the restrained, 
responsible agency the bureau carefully cultivated. Hoover was 
incensed and, in a rare move, circumvented the agents who usu-
ally wrote his correspondence and personally penned a letter 
to Editor William W. Waymack. The story was inaccurate and 
damaged an ongoing operation, Hoover told Waymack. “For 
your strictly confidential information, the premature publicizing 
of these cases has rendered ineffective detailed work performed 
over a considerable period of time,” Hoover wrote. In a sen-
tence included in his handwritten letter but edited out of the 
final, typewritten version sent to Waymack, Hoover claimed, 
disingenuously, “It has not been the practice of this Bureau to 
indulge in ‘news leaks’ or in ‘planted stories.’” Waymack ad-
mitted that Finney had erred by “stating categorically what was 
a belief or a contention” and offered to print Hoover’s response, 
or to send Washington correspondent Richard Wilson to inter-
view the director. Hoover, in a letter written by Nichols, refused 
both options.37
 Another critical editorial, published on July 19, 1955, was 
forwarded to Washington by the Des Moines SAC. The edito-
rial, headlined “Using Informers,” implicitly criticized the FBI 
and the Department of Justice for relying on paid informers to 
solve crimes. “Mr. Hoover is mistaken if he has gained the im-
pression that criticism that occasionally has been directed at the 
use of confidential and paid informers is intended as a campaign 
to end the practice.” Instead, the editors said, criticism of the use 
of informers is based on the Justice Department’s tendency to 
insufficiently vet informers’ reliability. The editorial, however, 
began and ended with praise for the FBI, leading off by praising 
the bureau’s 92 percent success rate in criminal cases that year 
and then closing with “that is the essence of the very best kind 
of law enforcement.” Once again, Hoover characterized a hand-
ful of critical statements as representing an organized smear 
campaign by anti-American forces intent on destroying the FBI. 
And despite its praise for the FBI, key Crime Records staff mem-
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ber Milton A. Jones evaluated the editorial as a harsh criticism. 
“After admitting the necessity of using ‘informers,’” Jones wrote, 
“the editorial, by implication, accuses Mr. Hoover of being 
mistakenly concerned over current criticisms of the use of in-
formants.” Jones then summarized the bureau’s relations with 
the Register and Tribune as “spotty.” “There have been instances 
of unwarranted criticism and untruthful statements concerning 
the FBI appearing on its editorial pages,” Jones wrote. He re-
minded Hoover that everyone connected with the Register and 
Tribune had been removed from FBI mailing lists in 1940 after 
the “Whoa, Edgar” editorial.38  
 Jones’s 1955 memorandum was not the last time represen-
tatives of the FBI pointed out the critical story of 1936 and the 
“Whoa, Edgar” editorial as examples of the bureau’s troubled 
relationship with the Register and Tribune. In 1958 a note on an 
outgoing letter addressed to Ogden G. Dwight, TV editor for 
the Register and Tribune, noted that the bureau’s “relations with 
this newspaper have fluctuated in the past 20 years.” A 1959 
memorandum discussing a request from Richard Wilson to meet 
with Hoover noted the critical story he had written in 1936 and 
the “Whoa, Edgar” editorial. The black mark of the 1936 story 
and the 1940 editorial appeared again in a note appended to a 
1960 letter. References to the early clashes between the FBI and 
the Register and Tribune continued through the 1960s, with the 
final reference to the “Whoa, Edgar” editorial appearing in an 
explanatory note attached to a letter from Director Clarence M. 
Kelley to Register Assistant City Editor William T. Kong in 1973, 
more than a year after Hoover’s death.39
 
THE BLACK MARK of the critical 1936 and 1940 publications 
lingered in FBI files and disrupted the relationship between the 
bureau and the Register and Tribune from time to time, but it did 
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not stop Nichols and his staff in the Crime Records Division from 
building relationships with individual reporters and editors 
from the newspapers. The bureau refused to forget perceived 
sleights, but it was unwilling to completely sever its connections 
to reporters and editors at the only statewide newspapers in 
Iowa. Those individual relationships, though, depended on the 
reporters and editors themselves initiating contact, currying fa-
vor with the bureau, and delivering publications the FBI found 
worthy of its time and attention. In a few instances, Des Moines 
reporters and editors were willing to allow the FBI to review 
and edit their work prior to publication.  
In 1936, for example, Vernon Pope contacted the FBI for 
help with a feature and photo story on kidnapping, bank rob-
bery, and white slavery that was slated for the first issue of Look 
magazine, a Cowles publication, that would be inserted in 13 
newspapers across the country. Pope agreed to provide copies 
of the five-page series to the FBI prior to publication. He sent 
them on November 30, 1936. Hoover’s Crime Records Division 
reviewed the series and on December 10 sent Pope three pages 
of highly detailed corrections and clarifications with a note say-
ing, “I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness in forwarding to 
the Bureau the above magazine pages which are being returned 
to you under a separate cover.” The corrections did not reach 
Pope in time, so the feature ran in its original form. Pope apolo-
gized to Hoover: “Unfortunately we had to close the issue be-
fore your letter was received. I am under the impression that we 
have made no serious errors but I am sorry we did not get your 
suggestions in time, as they would have improved the pages.”40
 Again, in 1937, a Register reporter agreed to allow the FBI to 
preview and edit a series of stories. Reporter William Nelson 
called the FBI on September 2, 1937, requesting information 
about the bureau’s use of science to solve crimes. No doubt 
pleased with the opportunity to publicize a key element of their 
public relations message, Crime Records Division officials for-
warded a large packet of case summaries and photographs 
along with a letter from Hoover. “After you have prepared your 
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script,” Hoover wrote, “I shall be very glad to have it reviewed 
prior to publication.” After speaking with Nichols by phone, 
Nelson agreed. “He stated that he wanted to be perfectly honest 
with the Bureau,” Nichols reported to Tolson, “but that the ma-
terial which he prepared was not prepared in final form and 
was drawn over by the copy writers out in Des Moines. How-
ever he was quite sure they would follow his request that prior 
to publication a copy of the publication be sent to him in order 
that he might send it to the Bureau for review.”41
 In 1953 Richard Wilson called Nichols looking for a specific 
document, the identity of which was redacted in the file. Ac-
cording to Nichols, “Wilson stated that if he could get posses-
sion of such a document and wrote a series of articles, what he 
would like would be to bring the articles over here and then let 
us edit out anything that should not go in.”42  
 The willingness to allow prior review of published stories 
about the FBI suggests how far journalists might go to gain ac-
cess to the bureau’s exploits, which were popular with readers. 
In most cases, though, reporters courting favor with the bureau 
simply resorted to flattery and expressions of support for the 
FBI’s work.  
 In 1955 Cowles Publications reporter Fletcher Knebel was 
working on a story about Hoover for the Cowles newspapers, 
including the Des Moines Register and Tribune. When Nichols 
was informed that Knebel was interviewing former special 
agents, he notified Tolson and submitted a memorandum on 
the reporter, who was referred to as a “close contact” of the FBI. 
Nichols explained, “By the term ‘close contact’ . . . it was meant 
that Knebel has been cooperative in the past, his attitude has 
been good regarding our work, and he has been most generous 
in allowing us to see his finished products prior to publication.”43
 Wilson, the author of the 1936 article, continued to mine his 
relationship with the FBI and Hoover for stories periodically 
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throughout his tenure as Cowles Media’s Washington Bureau 
Chief. A former Register city editor, Wilson was 28 when Mike 
Cowles sent him to Washington to open a news bureau.44 A 
summary of the bureau’s relationship with Wilson, requested by 
Nichols in 1950, reviewed the FBI’s contacts with the reporter. 
According to the report, Wilson was interviewed two or three 
times in connection with espionage cases and was cooperative; 
he invited Hoover to a cocktail party in 1945; he was under-
standing when Nichols refused to provide information for an 
article on communism in 1946; and he had contacted Hoover 
personally in relation to a fundraiser for the Urban League.45
 As was typical in FBI public relations, Wilson enjoyed peri-
odic “personal” correspondence with Hoover, with the letters 
from the director authored by agents in the Correspondence 
Unit of the Crime Records Division.46 In a flattering 1962 letter, 
Wilson wrote to Hoover that he hoped the director would “not 
retire for a long time” and urged that “safeguards should be 
considered to assure that the kind of FBI you so ably run will be 
continued that way.” Three years later, Wilson invited Hoover 
for cocktails after the annual Gridiron Dinner, but the director 
was busy.47  
 The relationship with Wilson was sufficiently cordial that 
in 1968 the bureau conducted an extensive investigation to de-
termine whether to approach him as a PSI, Potential Security 
Informer. Because of their access to powerful people in their 
communities, security informers in the media were particularly 
valued in the public relations–oriented FBI. The investigation 
of Wilson included a check of his credit records, a review of his 
career’s work, and interviews with other journalists who had 
become security informants. Hoover ultimately determined that 
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Wilson “would not appear to be the type of individual who 
would be amenable to direction in a controlled operation.”48
 During Wilson’s tenure as Cowles Media’s Washington Bu-
reau Chief, there were lengthy gaps between FBI contacts. For 
example, the FBI did not provide any information to Wilson for 
ten years starting in 1949. In 1959 the silence was broken when 
Wilson wrote to request a statement from Hoover about crime 
in the Midwest and comments on his thirty-fifth anniversary as 
FBI director. In his request, Wilson reminded then Crime Rec-
ords Division head Cartha DeLoach of his first collaboration 
with the bureau, his 1934 kidnapping series. DeLoach’s top aide 
recommended that the bureau cooperate with Wilson despite 
his authorship of the critical 1936 story. “It would appear that 
he is sincere in his desire to write a favorable story re the Direc-
tor and the Bureau,” Jones told DeLoach.49
 
MORE THAN any other Register and Tribune or Cowles Media 
reporter, Clark Mollenhoff maintained a close contact with the 
FBI. Mollenhoff was hired to join the Washington Bureau of 
Cowles Publications in 1950 and, except for a brief stint as an 
adviser to the Nixon administration, covered the nation’s capi-
tal until 1978. In 1958 he won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting 
on corrupt labor practices.50
 Like the bureau’s relationship with the Register and Tribune 
generally, its relationship with Mollenhoff was a roller coaster 
ride, with periods of cooperation, starting with Nichols’s eval-
uation of him in 1951 as looking “exceedingly good,” punctu-
ated by rejection and controversy. In 1953 Hoover contacted the 
Minneapolis SAC, noting that Mollenhoff, who wrote for Cowles 
newspapers in Minneapolis as well as Des Moines, would likely 
visit the Twin Cities. “Clark Mollenhoff is a responsible reporter 
and has been friendly and favorably disposed toward the Bureau 
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for several years,” Hoover wrote. “He should be courteously re-
ceived, but no confidential information should be made available 
to him.”51
 Mollenhoff first touched off controversy within the FBI in 
1958, when he contacted the bureau to ask about an alleged 
change in the procedures for investigating prospective presiden-
tial appointees. Mollenhoff said he had spoken with several peo-
ple at the White House who claimed that an extensive review of 
candidates’ finances had been added to the investigative process. 
Hoover refused to comment, and the FBI contacted President Ei-
senhower’s press secretary, James Hagerty, to find out who might 
have spoken to Mollenhoff. A change was being considered by 
the White House but had not been implemented, Hagerty said, 
claiming that no one had spoken to Mollenhoff. Hoover dis-
missed the incident as “just another instance of another ‘eager 
beaver’ of the press trying to hook us with a confirmation.”52  
 In 1961 Mollenhoff requested a meeting with Hoover to dis-
cuss law enforcement issues. Hoover’s staff argued against the 
meeting, noting the director’s “eager beaver” comment and high-
lighting Mollenhoff’s advocacy of openness in government, not 
a popular position within the secretive FBI. The bureau had 
taken notice two years earlier when Mollenhoff obliquely criti-
cized the FBI during a speech on the campus of Colby College 
in Maine that emphasized the people’s right to know and jour-
nalists’ obligation to press the government for information. 
“Columnists Drew Pearson and Joseph Alsop report that when 
they were critical of government policies and personalities, they 
found themselves subjected to the investigations of agents of 
the FBI and other government bureaus. They contended that no 
breach of security was involved but that they were subjected to 
probes to dry up their sources of information.”53
 The Colby College speech, along with a report that Presi-
dent Eisenhower had told Mollenhoff to “sit down” during a 
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news conference and the reporter’s acquaintance with Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy, were the reasons cited in a memoran-
dum recommending that Hoover not meet with the reporter.54 
Nonetheless, Hoover agreed to meet Mollenhoff, and the two 
sat down in the director’s office on September 29, 1961. During 
the meeting, Mollenhoff requested information on Soviet espio-
nage, on a 1960 speech by United Nations Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge, and on Dipa Nusantara Aidit, an aide to President 
Sukarno of Indonesia. At the end of the meeting, according to 
FBI notes, Mollenhoff expressed his appreciation and said he 
was “going to keep in touch with the Director because he found 
his views to be stimulating and reassuring.”55  
 After the meeting, Mollenhoff told a Hoover aide that the 
director’s views paralleled his own. Following the meeting, 
Mollenhoff was added to the FBI’s Special Correspondents List 
to receive additional bureau mailings.56 The meeting began a 
brief period of particularly cordial relations between Hoover 
and Mollenhoff. A few months later, Hoover’s letter writers 
wrote on his behalf to congratulate Mollenhoff on winning a 
John Peter Zenger Award for his efforts on behalf of press free-
dom. Mollenhoff replied, thanking Hoover for sending an auto-
graphed photograph. “I admire your restraint as much as your 
wisdom in your comments on the problems of law enforcement,” 
Mollenhoff wrote. “I doubt if I would be as restrained as you 
are if I had faced the problems for such a long time.”57
 In 1968 Mollenhoff again requested a meeting with Hoover. 
This time his request was rejected in a memorandum with ex-
tensive redactions.58 The 1968 rejection was, it appears, based 
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on new information about Mollenhoff’s close relationship with 
Robert F. Kennedy, a Hoover nemesis.59 Then in 1971 Mollen-
hoff requested an interview with Tolson, who had once lived in 
Iowa, for a feature story. Tolson refused. Hoover agreed with 
the decision. When a staff member called the director’s office to 
report that Mollenhoff had been so advised, Hoover scrawled, on 
the phone message, “No one in the Bureau should see this ‘rat.’”60
 The FBI had been aware of Mollenhoff’s acquaintance with 
Kennedy before earlier meetings. So what caused Hoover to 
permanently sever ties with the “rat” Mollenhoff in 1971? The 
likely cause was a series of 1970 special television news reports 
on Hoover by CBS News reporter John Hart. For his five-part 
series, Hart interviewed former attorneys general, members of 
Congress, and Clark Mollenhoff.61 Hoover refused to participate. 
The critical series suggested that Hoover had remained in office 
too long. A few weeks after the story aired, Mollenhoff, then in 
the midst of a brief stint on President Richard Nixon’s White 
House staff, requested information from Hoover. “No,” Hoover 
wrote on the request. “Let him get what information he wants 
from [Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John] Er-
lichman. Mollenhoff participated in a recent ‘hatchet’ job done 
by CBS.”62  
  
BEGINNING IN 1934, the FBI’s public relations staff carefully 
monitored and evaluated its relationships with the Des Moines 
Register and Tribune and its affiliated publications and bureaus. 
The SAC in Des Moines scanned the local newspapers daily and 
forwarded pertinent clippings, along with explanatory memo-
randa, to the FBI’s Washington headquarters. There, staffers in 
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the Crime Records Division evaluated the material and main-
tained an ongoing record of the ups and downs of the bureau’s 
relationships with reporters, editors, and publications. Agenda-
setting national publications and prominent national reporters 
received particular attention, but local and regional publications 
like the Des Moines Register and Tribune were also closely moni-
tored. Critical editorials were noted and, in some cases, merited 
a response. Reporters’ inquiries were fielded and considered. The 
rubric for considering some publications and reporters friends 
and others as foes was based on the FBI’s public relations tem-
plate emphasizing restraint, science, and a positive image of 
Hoover.  
 A critical story that undermined the FBI public relations tem-
plate might result in a temporary removal from the bureau’s 
mailing lists as happened twice to Des Moines Register and Trib-
une staff. A friendly story conforming to the FBI’s public rela-
tions template might result in being considered a friend even 
when one’s publication was critical, as with Hoover’s continued 
relationship with editorial cartoonist Jay N. “Ding” Darling. 
Stories or editorials that undercut the bureau’s public relations 
messages by alluding to concerns about federalized police pow-
ers or, even worse, questioning Hoover’s proclamations, could 
remain on a publication’s FBI record for decades.  
 The FBI’s up-and-down relationship with the Des Moines 
Register and Tribune and with key staffers like Richard Wilson 
and Clark Mollenhoff typifies its relationships with many other 
regional publications during the Hoover era. Some journalists 
and publications became adjuncts to the FBI, uncritically ampli-
fying Hoover’s xenophobic and paranoid worldview or attacking 
the director’s critics when asked.63 Others became outspoken 
critics of the FBI, risking Hoover’s wrath and the wrath of his 
media allies.64 Register and Tribune staff, for the most part, kept 
some editorial distance from the bureau and occasionally gently 
criticized Hoover and the FBI, but at times some of them were 
willing to flatter Hoover or fit their reporting to FBI public re-
lations rubrics in order to secure access to information.  
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